INTRODUCTION
The European Union (EU) is a promoter and protector of 'good governance' par excellence.
The Europeanization of its member states and attempts at external governance transfer towards third countries have earned the EU the name of a 'transformative' or 'normative' power (cf. Börzel and Risse 2009; Manners 2006 ). Yet, in comparison with other regional organizations, the EU has focused on the transformation of domestic governance institutions beyond rather than within its borders. Only recently, has the EU begun to develop policies and instruments that explicitly aim at protecting the very norms and values within its own member states that it has sought to transfer to accession candidates, neighbourhood countries and third states. Not only has the emergence of a comprehensive policy for internal governance transfer lagged behind the establishment of the EU's external policy by ten years. It is also much weaker than the EU's rhetoric and its practice of external governance transfer would suggest. This is all the more puzzling since problems with democratic pluralism, the independence of the judiciary, or minority rights, in both old and new member states, question the extent to which the EU has been effective in promoting and protecting governance standards internally.
In order to explain the late and rather weak engagement of the EU in internal governance transfer, we argue that the demand only arose with the prospect of the EU's Eastern enlargement. As a 'club of democracies', the EU did not see the need for internal governance transfer for the longest time. Alternative mechanisms, provided internally by infringement 255 proceedings and other instruments at the disposal of the European Commission and externally by the Council of Europe (CoE), were sufficient to protect the 'community of values' of the EU in its early years. It was the impending accession of a large number of new and potentially unstable democracies that created the initial demand for formal provisions to protect standards of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the EU. In particular, member states adopted Article 7 of the Amsterdam Treaty to lock in domestic changes in post-communist countries after their accession to the EU and thereby created specific post-accession instruments. In addition, the diffusion of governance transfer by regional organizations in the 1990s provided a supply for modelling the EU's democracy clause and for finally adopting its own Fundamental Rights Charter. Yet, the EU's provisions for internal governance transfer are much weaker compared to other regional organizations, reflecting the old member states' unwillingness to grant the EU powers to interfere with issues at the core of their political sovereignty.
The second part of the chapter will outline the puzzle of the EU's delayed and weak internal governance transfer. Since the late 1990s, the EU has institutionalized a number of provisions for protecting democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance in member states. However, lacking systematic monitoring and enforcement mechanisms beyond the 'nuclear option' or Article 7 and the protection of fundamental rights in the implementation of EU law by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), they seem to be symbolic rather than effective instruments. The third part explains the delayed establishment and weak institutional design of the EU's internal governance transfer by the functional demand for locking in democratic changes in the new members and the normative concern for the EU's international legitimacy as a normative power, on the one hand, and the reluctance of old member states to have the EU interfere with their sovereignty over issues of democracy and human rights, on the other. Moreover, regional integration by law has provided the EU with alternative policies and instruments to protect its fundamental values in the member states. The strongest mechanism for governance transfer appears to be the EU's anti-discrimination policy, since it works through the EU's supranational decision-making and enforcement procedures. However, it is also extremely limited in scope, focusing on one human rights principle rather than the EU's fundamental rights or other governance standards more broadly.
The Treaty of Amsterdam mandates the European Community to 'take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age based on the principle of anti-discrimination. In this field of action, the EU has even engaged in active promotion through Community programmes to combat discrimination (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and for employment and social solidarity (PROGRESS, 2007 (PROGRESS, -2013 .
In the early 2000s, the EU and its member states began to work on specifying their commitment to human rights more broadly, developing the EU's own Charter of Fundamental
Rights. The Treaty of Nice referred to the Fundamental Rights Charter, but it only took full legal effect as a catalogue of human rights to be respected by the EU and its member states in the application of EU Law with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009.
Moreover, the EU has no comparable 'catalogue' of standards, not to mention a respective acquis, specifying the other issue areas of democracy, the rule of law, and good governance.
Nor is the Charter backed by a systematic monitoring or enforcement mechanism as regards the compliance of member states. Still, it has quickly become a point of reference for the ECJ in judging the conformity of national legislation with human rights as part of EU law ( in that it extended the EU's systematic pre-accession monitoring and reporting system beyond the date of accession for a set of benchmarks that aimed at strengthening an independent judiciary in order to fight corruption and, in the case of Bulgaria, organized crime. In addition to bi-annual progress reports, it includes technical assistance and exchanges of information in order to facilitate compliance.
The EU's emerging post-accession policy is unprecedented, but much weaker than its preaccession instruments in terms of financial aid and incentives and also much more limited in its scope. Conditionality is barely considered effective given that 'the limited penalizing power of the remedial and preventive sanctions established in the framework of the CVM produces a very weak negative incentive structure' (Gateva 2010: 21) . Rather than locking in democratic changes in new member states, 'backsliding is a particular concern because the EU mechanisms for sanctioning members that violate EU democratic principles are relatively weak.' (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010: 458).
To sum up, the EU's commitment to governance standards emerged early in the mid-1980s and, with the Maastricht Treaty, covered the whole range of principles characteristic of a liberal democratic governance script. While the EU's move to governance transfer was in line with the global trend, its own rhetoric of a 'community of values' internally and a 'transformative' or 'normative' power externally has raised expectations that it has not met:
Neither has the EU been a pace-setter in the global surge of internal governance transfer nor has it opted for a particularly strong design promising to be effective in promoting and protecting its standards. Why has the EU been so reluctant to introduce strong mechanisms of internal governance transfer, particularly after it quickly became clear that processes of democratic consolidation in new member states were not irreversible? Moreover, these efforts focussed on anti-discrimination policies as a particular dimension of human rights that could be linked to market freedoms (employment) and had, in case of gender equality, their origins in Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome (equal pay).
Finally, the EU did not set its own governance standards. Instead, it referred to the legal heritage of its member states and the Conventions of the CoE. The CoE complemented projects of economic integration and cooperation in Europe, such as the EU and the European Free Trade Area, with a decidedly political dimension, including a well-developed and wellprotected regional human rights regime.
A New Demand for Internal Governance Transfer…
With the end of the Cold War, the situation changed radically. Finally, the institutionalization of internal governance transfer mechanisms was largely driven by internal demand factors. However, they were met by the supply of an emerging global script for governance transfer by regional organizations in the 1990s (Börzel and Stapel in this volume; Börzel, et al. 2013) . With the end of the Cold War, continental organizations, such as the CoE and the Organization of American States, had extended their initial focus on human rights to also prescribe and promote standards related to democracy, the rule of law, and good governance. Similarly, a growing number of regional economic communities outside of Europe also began to engage in (internal) governance transfer, including ECOWAS, SADC, and Mercosur. Yet, compared to these organizations, the institutional design of the EU's standards and instruments appears to be rather weak. It reflects an attempt by old member states to strike a balance between their demand for locking in the democratic and human rights reforms of new members, on the one hand, and unwillingness to give the EU the power to sanction undemocratic practices or human rights violations, on the other.
... but Only Weak Instruments
In all fairness, the member states of the EU have not had to face In sum, Article 7 would allow the EU to engage in internal governance transfer beyond the scope of Community legislation. Yet, instead of activating the potential of this broad mandate, the EU continues to rely on its traditional approach of ensuring the respect of fundamental rights in the implementation of European policies and developing a narrower human rights policy based on the principle of anti-discrimination. Relying on the EU's elaborate preaccession policy for supporting and stabilizing the political and economic transformation in the Central and Eastern European accession candidates, the old member states chose to opt for rather weak provisions that would signal the EU's commitment to its governance standards, paying tribute to normative expectations generated by its identity as a normative power, the diffusion of global script, and the need to avoid double standards, all while protecting their sovereignty from interferences through supranational mechanisms. Their preference for a rather weak institutional design aligned with the institutional self-interest of regional actors, such as the European Commission and the CoE, in strengthening their own sition in alternative settings for governance transfer.
CONCLUSION
Unlike other regional organizations, the EU initially focused on shaping the governance institutions of third countries and accession candidates rather than member states. Only with its 'big bang' Eastern enlargement, did the EU turn the patchwork of individual Community policies and the judicial protection of the fundamental rights of its 'market citizens' into a more comprehensive approach of internal governance transfer aimed at locking in democratic standards in new but eventually also in old member states. Next to the post-accession instruments based on conditionality and assistance, the EU has strengthened the constitutionalization of the very principles it has sought to protect and promote externally; its new anti-discrimination legislation and the Charter of Fundamental Rights do not only bind EU institutions but also the member states when they apply and enforce EU Law. Moreover, Article 7 and the Fundamental Rights Agency provide sanctioning and monitoring mechanisms that apply equally to old and new member states.
While these policies and instruments certainly provide a basis for internal governance transfer, they focus on human rights and the rule of law rather than democratic standards.
Moreover, (old) member states have been reluctant to allow for an effective monitoring of compliance with the principles enshrined in Article 2 and protected by Article 7. There are no instruments in place that would match the toolbox the EU has developed in its external democracy promotion and protection frameworks. As a result, the internal dimension has largely remained confined to the protection of democratic and human rights which had evolved from a 'spill-over' effect of Community legislation aimed at creating the Single European Market, as we could observe it in the fields of environmental and social regulation While acting as a pace-setter in external governance transfer, the EU's attempts to shape the governance institutions of its member states are even less remarkable in a global comparison of governance transfer by regional organizations. This should not be too surprising since the EU has always been a community of democracies. Democracy has always been a condition for joining the EU. The Europeanization of domestic structures by adopting the acquis communautaire and integrating into the Single European Market was considered sufficient to ensure that new member states converged with the governance standards of the old ones (Whitehead 1996) . The EU's approach to internal governance transfer only changed with Eastern enlargement, when the EU took on 10 new democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe. Not least due to the rise of right-wing populist parties in the EU-15, the mechanisms the EU had primarily installed to safeguard democratization in the new member states spilled over, making all member states equally subject to democracy protection and promotion policies.
Member state governments have been very reluctant to accept the control of the EU over their democratic institutions. Given their limited demand, the EU's attempts at internal governance transfer still appear modest and remain driven by the European Commission and the ECJ, seeking to protect the fundamental rights of EU citizens through individual Community policies. Yet, despite the resistance of the member states against the implementation of a comprehensive approach that would mirror its external governance transfer, the EU is no real laggard when compared to other regional organizations: Going beyond formal provisions for governance transfer, European integration provides an institutionally dense environment with a web of obligations and enforcement mechanisms that might be more effective than political declarations and formal procedures -a proposition that not only the increasing democratic backsliding by Hungary, the best pupil in the class of the CEEC, is putting to the test. The
Euro crisis has revealed severe problems in Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain regarding compliance with the EU's governance standards. Enlargement and the Euro crisis may give 271 new impetus for EU powers on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. The European
Commission recently launched an initiative for a European Public Prosecutor and monitoring powers for the rule of law in member states. It remains to be seen whether member states will be able to maintain their resistance against more centralized mechanisms of internal governance transfer, particularly given the damage current developments are doing to the EU's international legitimacy as a normative power.
NOTES
1 The Lisbon Treaty changed the text into 'values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities' (Article 2 TEU Lisbon).
